**“What Do We Know about Philosophy and Philosophers**

**at the End of *Republic*Book V?”**

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**T1. Pl. *Gorgias* 484c5-e1, 485d:**

Philosophy may be a charming affair for the young but those who continue to pursue it as adults are deprived of everything you need to know in order to become an outstanding, admirable man. They remain ignorant of the laws of the city and the right way to discuss matters of business, both public and private, of human desires and pleasures, and, in a word, altogether ignorant of the ways of men. If they ever turn to action, personal or political, they become laughingstocks . . . I think that older men who don’t give it up but continue with it only deserve to be thrashed . . . because it is unmanly to avoid the center of the city and the public squares, where the poet says men find fame and glory, and slink away out of sight, living the rest of your life in some out-of-the-way spot, whispering along with three or four boys, never speaking like a free, powerful, and capable man.

(Cp. *R.* VI, 487c6-d5, very similar view expressed by Adeimantus, suggesting it was a commonplace.)

**T2.**

***Eu.* 6c9-e6**: Clear contrast between the pious, the *eidos* itself, and the one *idea* (τὸ ὃσιον, εκεῖνο αύτὸ τὸ εἶδος, μία ἰδέα) on the one hand and the many other pious things (ἄλλα πολλά . . . ὅσια) on the other. The latter, as we will see in the case of the sightlovers, turn out to be—the very same things—both pious and impious (ὅσια καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αύτά, 8a7, cf. a11-12).

***Pr.* 330b6-e2:** Protagoras, the great relativist, agrees immediately that justice is something (πρᾶγμά τι) and refers to it as “justice itself” (ὴ δικαιοσύνη αὐτὸ τοῦτο); the case is similar with piety, which is also something and can be referred to as “piety itself” (αὐτὴ ἡ ὁσιότης). Protagoras even endorses “self-predication” and agrees that justice is just and piety, pious independently of any commitment to the theory of Forms.

See also ***Pr.* 332c2-9**, where Protagoras agrees readily that both the beautiful and the high (in voice) are one and have one opposite—the ugly and the low respectively—only. Other instances of the vocabulary that eventually becomes—but is not yet—part of the theory of Forms include temperance itself (αὐτὴ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ***Ch.* 116b6**); courage itself (αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ***La.* 194a3**); one and the same *eidos* (ἔν γέ τι εἶδος**, *M.* 72c7**), the same *eidos* everywhere (ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδος,***M.* 72d8**), a contrast between the one *eidos* and “the many” (πολλἀ) that Meno, like the sightlovers, remains focused on (***M.* 74d3, 77a7**); and the beautiful itself (αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ***Hma.* 289c3**).

**T3. *La.* 193e3:** ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, ***Ch.* 158c4**: σωφροσύνης μετέχειν, ***Pr.* 323a6**: μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης, ***G.* 467e7**: μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

**T4. Arist. *Apr.* I.38, 49a33-34**: ἦν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τινὸς ὄντος ὃτι τὶ ὄν. See also ***Apo.* I.2, 71b25-26**: οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπίστασθαι; cf. ***Apo.* II.19, 100a8-9**: τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

**T5. *Crat.* 385b7-8**: Ἆρ’ οὖν οὗτος ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὃς δ’ ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής;

Cf. **Arist.** ***Met.* 1011b26-28**: τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές, ὥστε καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται.

**T6. Parmenides, DK B2.7-8**: οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) οὔτε φράσαις; cf. **DK B6.1**: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι; **B8.8-9**: οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἐστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι; **B8.35**: οὐ γὰρ [ἄνευ](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=aneu&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1) [τοῦ](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=tou&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1) [ἐόντος](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=eontos&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1), [ἐν](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=en&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1) [ᾧ](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=ho%5Ei&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1) [πεφατισμένον](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=pephatismenon&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1) [ἐστιν](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=estin&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1), εὑρήσεις [τὸ](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=to&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1) [νοεῖν](http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/morphindex?lookup=noein&.submit=Analyze+Form&lang=greek&formentry=1).

**T7. Parmenides DK B2.9**: ἔστιν τε καὶ . . . οὐκ ἔστι µὴ εἶναι with **B8.5, 20-25**.

**T8.** The functions of all three powers should be co-ordinate.

That is, *epistēmē* is

ἐπἱ τῷ ὄντι, over what is

and its function is

τὁ ὂν γνῶναι ὡς ἔχει, to have *gnōsis* that what is, is

while the function of doxa, whose range we don’t yet know, is,

 τὁ ὂν δοξάζειν ὡς ἔχει, to have *doxa* that what is, is

and the function of *agnoia,* which is

 ἐπὶ τῷ μἠ ὄντι, over what is not

is

 το ὂν ἀγνοεῖν ὡς ἔχει, to have *agnoia* that what is is

**T9. Meno 77d7-e4**: Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι οὗτοι οὐ μὲν τῶν κακῶν ἔπιθυμοῦσιν, οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτά, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων ἃ ᾤοντο ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτά γε κακά. ὥστε οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτὰ καὶ οἰόμενοι ἀγαθὰ εἶναι δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν επιθυμοῦσιν. ἣ οὔ;